Primitives for authentication in process algebras  by Bodei, Chiara et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 271–304
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Primitives for authentication in process algebras
Chiara Bodeia, Pierpaolo Deganoa ;∗, Riccardo Focardib, Corrado Priamic
aDipartimento di Informatica, Universita di Pisa, Corso Italia, 40, I-56125 Pisa, Italy
bDipartimento di Informatica, Universita Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, Via Torino 155, I-30173 Venezia, Italy
cDipartimento Scienti'co Tecnologico, Universita di Verona, Ca’ Vignal 2, Strada Le Grazie, 15,
I-37134 Verona, Italy
Abstract
We extend the -calculus and the spi-calculus with two primitives that guarantee authentication.
They enable us to abstract from various implementations=speci.cations of authentication, and to
obtain idealized protocols which are “secure by construction”. The main underlying idea, origi-
nally proposed in Focardi (Proc. Sixth Italian Conf. on Theoretical Computer Science, November
1998) for entity authentication, is to use the locations of processes in order to check who is
sending a message (authentication of a party) and who originated a message (message authen-
tication). The theory of local names, developed in Bodei et al. (Theoret. Comput. Sci. 253(2)
(2001) 155) for the -calculus, gives us almost for free both the partner authentication and the
message authentication primitives. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Security; Authentication; Secrecy; Operational semantics; Proved transition systems;
Distributed process algebras
1. Introduction
Authentication is one of the main issues in security and it can have di<erent purposes
depending on the speci.c application considered. For example, entity authentication is
related to the veri.cation of an entity’s claimed identity [19], while message authen-
tication should make it possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin
[30]. In recent years there have been some formalizations of these di<erent aspects
of authentication (see, e.g., [3, 8, 13, 16, 17, 22, 29]). These formalizations are crucial
for proofs of authentication properties, that sometimes have been automatized (see e.g.
[12, 15, 20, 21, 25]). A typical approach presented in the literature is the following.
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First, a protocol is speci.ed in a certain formal model. Then the protocol is shown
to enjoy the desired properties, regardless of its operating environment, that can be
unreliable, and can even harbour a hostile intruder.
We use here basic calculi for modelling concurrent and mobile agents and we give
then certain kinds of semantics, o<ering built-in mechanisms that guarantee authen-
tication. This is the main contribution of our paper. Our mechanisms enable us to
abstract from the various implementations=speci.cations of authentication, and to ob-
tain idealized protocols which are “secure by construction”. Our protocols, or rather
their speci.cations can then be seen as a reference for proving the correctness of “real
protocols”.
The essence of concurrent and mobile computation can be studied in a pure form us-
ing the -calculus [24], a foundational calculus based on the notion of naming. Systems
are speci.ed as expressions called processes. These are obtained by combining, via a
few operators (parallel composition, nondeterministic choice, declarations), the basic
actions of sending and of receiving names between processes along channels. Names
represent values, or messages, and also channels. Since processes exchange names in
communications, the interconnection structure of a network can vary dynamically. Re-
cently, Abadi and Gordon [3] de.ned the spi-calculus by enriching the -calculus with
primitives for encryption and decryption. The resulting calculus is particularly suited
to security issues, among which authentication.
In [7] the -calculus has been equipped with a structural operational semantics which
endows each sequential process P in the whole system with its own local environment,
i.e., P has its local space of names and its local name manager that generates a fresh
name, whenever necessary. The basic ingredient of this proposal is the notion of relative
address of a process P with respect to another process Q: it represents the path between
P and Q in (an abstract view of) the network (as de.ned by the syntax of the calculus).
Note that relative addresses are not available to the users of the -calculus: they are
used by the abstract machine of the calculus only, de.ned by its semantics.
We propose here to use the ideas underlying this proposal to study authentication,
both in the -calculus and in the spi-calculus. As a matter of fact, this kind of semantics
provides us with two built-in authentication primitives. The key point is that P can
use its address relative to Q to uniquely reach (the subterm of the whole system
representing) Q itself. Consequently, relative addresses may be used both to authenticate
the partners of a communication and to authenticate the origin of a message. For the
sake of presentation, we will .rst introduce our primitive for partner authentication in
the -calculus, and the one of message authentication in the spi-calculus. We can easily
combine them, e.g. by introducing the .rst mechanism in the spi-calculus so that both
kinds of authentication can be enforced.
1.1. Partner authentication
A variation of the semantics de.ned in [7] gives us a run-time mechanism that
guarantees each principal to engage an entire run session with the same partners, playing
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the same roles. Essentially, we bind sensitive input and output communications to a
relative address, i.e. a process P can accept communications on a certain channel, say
c, only if the relative address of its partner is equal to an a-priori .xed address loc.
In order to achieve this, we index channels with relative addresses, so obtaining
input actions on the form cloc(x) or output actions of the form Idloc′〈M 〉. While sending
a message, our semantics will check if the address of the sender with respect to the
receiver is indeed loc. In particular, assume that P is explicitly waiting a message from
a process reachable following loc, i.e. P performs the input action cloc(x). Then, no
possibly hostile process E having a relative address with respect to P di<erent from
loc, can successfully communicate with P on c. Moreover, E cannot sni< any message
M sent by P through the output action Idloc′〈M 〉, if the address of E relative to P
is di<erent from loc′. These “located” I=O primitives enable processes to have some
control on their partners. As an example we can de.ne, in the -calculus syntax, a
protocol that guarantees partner authentication by construction, by putting in parallel
the following processes:
P = Ic〈M 〉: P′;
Q = clocP (x):Q
′;
where locP represents the address of P relative to Q, c〈M 〉 stands for sending M
along c to every possible process (the channel c is not indexed by any relative address,
formally by the empty one), and clocP (x) is an input action located at locP . The input
can only match an output c〈M 〉 executed by the process reachable from Q through the
relative address locP . The resulting communication has the e<ect of binding x to M
within the residual of Q, yielding Q′[M=x] (i.e. Q′ where M replaces x).
If we consider P, Q and also an intruder E in parallel, (P |Q) |E, the e<ect is to
guarantee to Q that the communication over c can only be performed with P. Thus, Q
is assured that message M has been indeed received by P. Note that there is no need
for c to be a channel private to P and Q.
Although in this paper we focus on authentication primitives, it is interesting to note
that located outputs also guarantee a form of secrecy. As an example consider the
following protocol where now P uses a located output:
P = IclocQ〈M 〉: P′;
Q = clocP (x):Q
′;
where locQ is the address of Q relative to P. Consider again (P |Q) |E. Now, P is
also guaranteed that the communication over c will be only performed with Q, i.e., E
cannot intercept M which will thus remain secret. Again, the channel c need not to be
private to P and Q. So, we separately model authentication and secrecy over public
channels: our mechanism is thus more concrete than the use of a private channel for
communication.
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In every protocol, legitimate processes may play a few di<erent roles, such as sender,
server, receiver, etc. Usually, processes recognize the roles their partners are playing,
but seldom they know which are the partners’ relative addresses. So, we shall also in-
dex a channel with a variable , to be instantiated by a relative address, only. Whenever
a process P, playing for instance the role of sender or initiator, has to communicate
for the .rst time with another process S in the role, e.g. of server, it uses a channel c.
Our semantics rules will take care of instantiating  with the address of P relative to
S during the communication. Roughly, this implements a sort of anonymous commu-
nication. Note that the process S could also be a hostile process pretending to be the
server. However, from that point on, P and S will keep communicating in the same
roles for the entire session, using their relative addresses.
We have sketched how our mechanism guarantees that each principal communicates
with the same partners, in the same role, for the entire session. Through it, we also
circumvent some problems arising from mixing up sessions, in particular, those due
to replay attacks. Usually, protocols use challenge-response mechanisms, based e.g. on
nonces (typically numbers used once), whose freshness protects from replay attacks.
In our framework, freshness is no longer needed to distinguish the communications of
one session from the communications of another.
1.2. Message authentication
The semantics in [7] and its extension to the spi-calculus studied in Section 7 (see
also [5]) directly allow to de.ne another authentication mechanism, providing us with
a built-in primitive that enables the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin, i.e.
the process that created it. In fact, the address of a message M relative to a process P,
uniquely identi.es the originator of M , even after the message has been maliciously
intercepted and forwarded. Indeed, we guarantee the integrity of the message M : its
receiver gets it as the originator of M made it. If M is a compound message, the
receiver can additionally ascertain the originators of the components of M . We write the
primitive for authentication as [M
@
=P]Q, where M is a message and P is a process. 1
Intuitively, the execution of the process Q starts only when the check [M
@
=P] succeeds,
and this happens if and only if the relative addresses of M and of P with respect to Q
coincide: in other words, Q is the generator of M . Note again that this check is done
by the interpreter of the calculus, i.e. the semantic rules, not by the user.
A communication protocol that guarantees message authentication by construction is
now easy to de.ne, by using the plain handshaking communication of the -calculus
and the spi-calculus, and the primitive sketched above. Suppose that a process P sends
a message M (for simplicity we consider below a name) to Q along a public channel c.
1 Actually, we have [M
@
=N ]Q, where N is a message from P; see the formal development for details.
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In the spi-calculus syntax they have the following form:
P = (M) Ic〈M 〉: P′ and Q = c(x):[x @=P]Q′;
where the operator (M) declares M to be a fresh name, di<erent from all the others
in the whole system. If we put P;Q and also an intruder E in parallel, (P |Q) |E, the
e<ect is to guarantee that the residual of Q is indeed Q′[M=x]. Note that here Q is not
guaranteed to receive the message directly from P, as for partner authentication. As a
matter of fact, the intruder might as well have intercepted the message M originated
by P and forwarded it to Q. This is legal as we are only checking that M has been
originated by P. As we will see, E cannot modify any of the parts of M without
changing the relative address of M itself, because relative addresses are manipulated
by the semantics only. Also in this case, there is no need for c to be a channel private
to P and Q.
Our solutions assume that the implementation of the communication primitives has
a reliable mechanism to control and manage relative addresses. In some real cases this
is possible, e.g., if the network management system .lters every access of a user to
the network as it happens in a LAN or in a virtual private network. This may not be the
case in many other situations. However, relative addresses can be built by storing the
actual address of processes in selected, secure parts of message headers (cf. IPsec [31]).
Yet, our solutions may help checking the correctness of di<erent implementations, e.g.
those based on cryptography, as brieNy discussed in the conclusion.
Contents of this paper. In Section 2 we survey the -calculus; in Section 3, we recall
relative addresses and in Section 4 the proved version of the -calculus from [7].
Section 5 is devoted to partner authentication. In Section 6 we survey the spi-calculus
and in Section 7 we enrich it with the relative address mechanism. Sections 8 and 9
are about the message authentication primitive.
2. The -calculus
In this section we brieNy recall the monadic -calculus [24], a model of concurrent
communicating processes based on the notion of naming. Our presentation slightly
di<ers from the usual ones and it will make it easier to introduce later on the spi-
calculus. The main di<erence from standard presentation relies in the introduction of
the new syntactic category of terms, where names and variables are distinguished.
Denition 2.1 (Syntax). Terms (denoted by M;N; : : : ∈T) and processes (denoted by
P;Q; R; : : : ∈ P) are built according to the syntax
M ::= terms
a; b; m; n; : : : ∈N names
x; y; : : : ∈V variables
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P ::= processes
0 nil
:P pre.x
P + P summation
P|P parallel composition
(m)P restriction
[M =N ]P matching
!P replication
where  may either be M (x) for input or M 〈N 〉 for output.
Hereafter, the trailing 0 will be omitted. We often write ·˜ to denote tuples of objects,
for instance m˜ for the vector (m1; : : : ; mr); actually we feel free to consider and to
operate on m˜ as if it were a set. Notations are extended componentwise, e.g. (n˜)
stands for (n1); : : : ; (nr); we assume (m)(n˜)= (m; n˜); .nally, () means that there
are no restricted names.
Intuitively, 0 represents the null process which can do nothing. The pre.x  is the
.rst atomic action that the process :P can perform. After the execution of  the process
:P behaves like P. The input pre.x M (x) binds the name x in the pre.xed process as
follows: when a name N is received along the link named M , all the (free) occurrences
of x in the pre.xed process P are substituted with M . The output pre.x M 〈N 〉 does not
bind the name N which is sent along M . Summation denotes nondeterministic choice.
The process P1 + P2 behave like either P1 or P2. The operator | describes parallel
composition of processes. The components of P1|P2 may act independently; also, an
output action of P1 (resp. P2) at any output port M may synchronize with an input
action of P2 (resp. P1) at M . The value sent by P1 replaces the relevant occurrences of
the placeholder x in P2. The operator (m) acts as a static declaration (i.e. a binder for)
the name m in the process P that it pre.xes. In other words, m is a unique name in P
which is di<erent from all the external names. The agent (m)P behaves as P except
that actions at ports Im and m are prohibited. However communications along link m
of components within P are allowed. Matching [M =N ]P is an if–then operator:
process P is activated only if M =N . Finally, the process !P behaves as in.nitely
many copies of P running in parallel.
We write fn(M) and fn(P) for the sets of names free in term M and process P,
respectively, and fv(M) and fv(P) for the sets of variables free in term M and process
P, respectively. A closed term or process is a term or process without free variables.
2.1. Semantics
The semantics for the -calculus we consider here is a late semantics, based on
a reduction relation and on a commitment relation. Some structural congruence rules
are also needed. The commitment relation depends on the abstraction and concretion
constructs:
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• An abstraction has the form (x)P, where (x) binds x in P.
• A concretion has the form (m˜)〈M 〉P, where M is a term, P is a process and the
names in m˜ are bound by (m˜) in M and P.
An agent A or B is an abstraction, a concretion or a process.
If F is the abstraction (x)P and C the concretion (m˜)〈M 〉Q and {m˜}∩ fn(P)= ∅,
then the interactions F@C and C@F are:
F@C = (m˜)(P[M=x] | Q);
C@F = (m˜)(Q | P[M=x]):
Congruence: The structural congruence ≡ on processes is de.ned in the standard
way, except for the treatment of parallel composition that is assumed to be neither
commutative nor associative. It is then de.ned to be the least congruence satisfying:
• if P and Q are -equivalent then P≡Q;
• (P=≡;+; 0) is a commutative monoid;
• (m) (P1|P2)≡ (m)P1|P2 and (m)(P2|P1)≡P2|(m)P1 if m =∈ fn(P2), and
(m)P≡P if m =∈ fn(P).
• (m) (x)P=(x) (m)P
• R|(x)P=(x) (R|P) and (x)P|R=(x) (P|R), if x =∈ fv(R)
• R|(m˜) 〈M 〉Q=(m˜) 〈M 〉(R|Q); and (m˜) 〈M 〉Q |R=(m˜) 〈M 〉 (Q |R);
if {m˜}∩ fn(R)= ∅,
In the following, we will never distinguish congruent terms.
Reduction relation: The reduction relation ¿ is the least relation on closed processes
that is transitive and closed under all contexts, and that satis.es the following axioms:
Red Repl: !P¿P | !P.
Red Match: [M =M ]P¿P.
Commitment relation: An action is a name m (representing input) or a co-name Im
(representing output) or a distinguished silent action . Note that actions record only
the channel on which the input or the output occurs. The commitment relation is
written P →A, where P is a closed process,  is an action, and A is a closed agent. It
is de.ned by the rules in Table 1.
3. Relative addresses and their composition
We recall here the ideas of [7] that serve as a basis for the authentication mechanisms
we are going to introduce. Consider for a while the binary parallel composition as
the main operator of the -calculus (neither associative nor commutative). Then, build
abstract syntax trees of processes as binary trees, called trees of (sequential) processes,
as follows. Given a process P, the nodes of its tree correspond to the occurrences of
the parallel operator in P, and its leaves are the sequential components of P (roughly,
278 C. Bodei et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 271–304
Table 1
The commitment relation
Comm Out
m〈M〉: P Im→ ()〈M〉P
Comm In
m(x): P m→ (x)P
Comm Sum 1
P →A
P + Q →A
Comm Sum 2
Q →A
P + Q →A
Comm Par 1
P →A
P|Q →A|Q
Comm Par 2
Q →A
P|Q →P|A
Comm Inter 1
P m→F Q Im→C
P|Q →F@C
Comm Inter 2
P Im→C Q m→F
P|Q →C@F
Comm Res
P →A  =∈{m; Im}
(m)P → (m)A
Comm Red
P¿Q Q →A
P →A
Comm Struct
P≡Q Q →A A≡A′
P →A′
Fig. 1. The tree of (sequential) processes of (P0|P1)|(P2|(P3|P4)).
those processes whose top-level operator is a pre.x or a summation or a replication).
A tree of processes is depicted in Fig. 1.
Assume now that the left (resp. right) branches of a tree of sequential processes
denote the left (resp. right) component of parallel compositions, and label their arcs
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with tag ‖0 (resp. ‖1). Therefore, any sequential component in a process is uniquely
identi.ed by a string # over {‖0; ‖1}∗. The string corresponds to a path from the
root,the top-level | of the whole process, to a leaf. Intuitively, # is the address of the
sequential component relative to the root of the binary tree.
Consider now two di<erent sequential processes, say G and R, in a tree and call
the path between them the address of the process G relative to the process R. This
relative address can be decomposed into two parts according to the minimal common
predecessor P of G and R in the tree. The relative address is then a string written
#•#′, made of ‖0’s and ‖1’s, where # represents the path from P to R, 2 and #′ the
path from P to G. Let G and R, respectively, be the processes P3 and P1 of Fig. 1.
The address of P3 relative to P1 is then ‖0‖1•‖1‖1‖0 (read the path upwards from P1 to
the root and reverse, then downwards to P3). So to speak, the relative address points
back from R to G.
Relative addresses can be composed, in order to obtain new relative addresses. For
instance, the composition of the relative address ‖1‖0•‖0‖1 of P1 w.r.t. P2 (in Fig. 1)
with the relative address of P3 w.r.t. P1, ‖0‖1•‖1‖1‖0 is the relative address ‖0•‖1‖0 of
P3 w.r.t. P2.
Below we recall the formal de.nition of relative addresses and we de.ne their com-
position. More intuition, the full de.nitions and the statements of some of their prop-
erties are in [7].
Denition 3.1 (Relative addresses). Let #i; #′i ∈ {‖0; ‖1}∗, let ) be the empty string,
and let ⊕ be the sum modulo 2. Then, the set of relative addresses, ranged over by
l, is
A = {#0•#1: #i = ‖j#′i ⇒ #i⊕1 = ‖j⊕1#′i⊕1; i; j = 0; 1}:
We will sometimes omit ) in relative addresses, e.g. we write •n for )•) n.
A relative address l′=#′•# is compatible with l, written l′= l−1, if and only if
l=#•#′.
As we said before, we use relative addresses to encode paths between pairs of nodes
of binary trees of processes, like the one in Fig. 1. Note that the condition ‖0#′0•‖1#′1
(and ‖1#′0•‖0#′1) makes it explicit that the two components of the relative address
describe the two distinct paths going out from the same node in a binary tree. Also,
l′= l−1 when both refer to the same path, exchanging its source and target. Address
composition is a partial operation, de.ned only when relative addresses can indeed be
composed. We make sure that this is always the case when we apply it. Fig. 2 depicts
all the cases in which this happens.
Denition 3.2 (Address composition). Address composition ? : (A×A)*A is de-
.ned by the following three exhaustive cases:
2 For technical reasons we take the path from P to R instead of the more natural path from R to P.
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Fig. 2. The three possible relative placements of three processes G; S, and R. The result of the composition
of the relative addresses of S w.r.t. R and of G w.r.t. S is represented by the solid arrows.
1. #0•#?#2#•#3 =#2#0•#3 with #2 = ),
2. #0•#1#?#•#3 =#0•#1#3 with #1 = ),
3. #′#0•#?#•#′#3 =#0•#3.
It is immediate to see that ? has a neutral element (i.e. l ? )•)= )•) ? l= l), an
inverse for each element (i.e. the inverse of l is l−1) and that ? is associative (i.e.
(l ? l′)? l′′= l ? (l′ ? l′′)), whenever de.ned.
4. Proved semantics
Relative addresses can be inductively built while deducing transitions, when a proved
semantics is used [10]. In this section, we recall from [9] the proved transition system
for the -calculus, in which labels of transitions encode (a portion of) their deduction
tree. The arrows of the proved transition system are labelled by @#, where  is an
action and # is a string of ‖0; ‖1, used to single out the sub-process that actually
performed . The rules for proved commitment are in Table 2. They are essentially
those of the standard transition system except for those involving the parallel operator.
Rule Comm Par 1 (resp. Comm Par 2) adds in the label of its conclusion the tag ‖0
(resp. ‖1) to register that the left (resp. right) component of a parallel composition is
moving. The rules de.ning the congruence and the reduction relation are indeed the
same as before. To recover the standard semantics of the -calculus, we only need to
erase any occurrence of # from the labels of transitions.
Note that the information added to labels can be used to inductively build relative
addresses. Indeed, the tags ‖i are suRcient to recover the parallel structure of a process
P because they provide an encoding of the tree of processes of P. For instance, suppose
that process :P performs the transition @‖0. Then, we know that the -action was
performed by a sequential process on the form :P in parallel with some process Q.
Indeed, the whole system had the form :P|Q. More generally, if a process R performs
a transition @#, the path # in the tree of processes permits to reach the sub-process
that performs the  action. Technically, we indicate the sub-process R as P@#, which
is inductively selected through the following operator.
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Table 2
The proved commitment relation
Comm Out
m〈M〉:P Im→ () 〈M〉P
Comm In
m(x):P m→ (x)P
Comm Sum 1
P
@#−→A
P + Q
@#−→A
Comm Sum 2
Q
@#−→A
P + Q
@#−→A
Comm Par 1
P
@#−→A
P|Q @‖0#−→ A|Q
Comm Par 2
Q
@#−→A
P|Q @‖1#−→ P|A
Comm Inter 1
P
m@#−→F Q Im@#
′
−→ C
P|Q →F@C
Comm Inter 2
P
Im@#→ C Q m@#
′
−→ F
P|Q →C@F
Comm Res
P
@#−→A  =∈ {m; Im}
(m)P
@#−→ (m)A
Comm Red
P¿Q Q
@#−→A
P
@#−→A
Comm Struct
P ≡ Q Q @#−→A A ≡ A′
P
@#−→A′
Denition 4.1. The localization operator @# is de.ned on processes by induction as
follows:
1. P@)=P;
2. ((m)P)@#=(m)(P@#);
3. (P0|P1)@‖i#=Pi@#, for i=0; 1;
4. ([M =N ]P)@#= [M =N ](P@#);
This de.nition will be helpful at the end of Sections 5 and 8.
Back to Fig. 1, if P3 communicates with P1, the whole process Sys=(P0|P1)|(P2|
(P3|P4)) performs a computation step. The sub-process P3 performing the output is
Sys@‖1‖1‖0 and the sub-process P1 performing the input is Sys@‖0‖1. By putting
together the single paths, we obtain the relative address ‖0‖1•‖1‖1‖0 of P3 relative
to P1.
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5. Partner authentication
We now introduce our .rst authentication mechanism. At run-time, it will guarantee
each principal to engage an entire run session with the same partners playing the same
roles. We heavily exploit the proved semantics reported in the previous section. We
essentially bind sensitive input and output communications to relative addresses. More
precisely, channels may have a relative address as index, and assume the form cl.
Now, our semantics will ensure that P communicates with Q on cl if and only if the
relative address of P w.r.t. Q is indeed l (and that of Q w.r.t. P is l−1). Notably, even
if another process R =Q possesses the channel cl; R cannot use it to communicate
with P. Consequently, a hostile process can never interfere with P and Q while they
communicate, not even eavesdrop the exchanged messages.
By using these “located” channels, processes may have some control on their part-
ners. But often a process P is willing to communicate with several processes, usually
through one or very few channels. So, we shall also index a channel with a variable
 to be instantiated. Suppose that process P, playing for instance the role of sender
or of initiator, wants to communicate with a process S (e.g. the server), that P does
not know the relative address of S, say l, and .nally that the involved channel is c.
Then, during the .rst communication of P with S,  will be instantiated within P by l
(recall that our proved operational semantics indeed computes l). Symmetrically for S,
if it uses the same channel c (with a di<erent variable ′, i.e., S uses c′). In a sense,
this is the case of anonymous communication. Note however that S may as well use
an already located channel cl′ : the communication occurs only if l−1 = l′. From that
point on, P and S will keep communicating in the same roles for the entire session,
using their, now known, relative addresses.
Thus, we extend the names that occur in processes by indexing them with a location,
de.ned to be either a relative address l=#•#′ or a variable  to be instantiated by a
relative address. Formally,
Denition 5.1. Let - ; ′; : : : ; 0; : : : be a countable set of (address) variables, and let
Loc=-∪A t. Then, NLoc = {mt |m∈N; t ∈Loc} is the set of located channels.
Usually, the empty location t= )•) is omitted.
The rules de.ning the congruence and the reduction relation are the same as before,
apart from the obvious substitution of located names for names. The rules for the
new commitment relation are in Table 3, where we omit the symmetric rules for
communication. The rules for parallel composition are in the proved style, recording
which component (left or right) of the process is moving. There, some of the arrows are
annotated also with a location. For each I=O action rule, the location t of the channel
involved is recorded under the arrow, and it is preserved by all non-communication
rules and discarded by communications. This location t is used in the premises of
communication rules, to establish the relative addresses of one process with respect to
the other. In fact, if the .rst process (the receiver) performs an input m@# and the
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Table 3
The proved located commitment relation
Comm Out
mt〈M〉:P
Im→
t
()〈M〉P
Comm In
mt(x):P
m→
t
(x)P
Comm Sum 1
P
@#−→
t
A
P + Q
@#−→
t
A + Q
Comm Par 1
P
@#−→
t
A
P|Q @‖0#−→
t
A|Q
Comm InterL 1
P
m@#−→
l
F Q
Im@#′−→
l′
C
P|Q →F@C
if
{
(l = ‖0#•‖1#′ ∨ l= )•)) ∧
(l′ = ‖1#′•‖0#∨ l′ = )•))
Comm InterL; - 1
P
m@#−→
l
F Q
Im@#′−→
′
C
P|Q →F@C{|l′=′|}@#′
{
if (l= ‖0#•‖1#′ ∨ l= )•))
where l′ = ‖1#′•‖0#
Comm Inter- 1
P
m@#−→

F Q
Im@#′−→
′
C
P|Q →F{|l=|}@#@C{|l−1=′|}@#′
where l= ‖0#•‖1#′
Comm Res
P
@#−→
t
A  =∈{m; Im}
(m)P
@#−→
t
(m)A
Comm Red
P¿Q Q
@#−→
t
A
P
@#−→
t
A
Comm Struct
P ≡ Q Q @#−→
t
A A ≡ A′
P
@#−→
t
A′
second process (the sender) performs the complementary output action Im@#′, then the
relative address of the sender with respect to the receiver is ‖0#•‖1#′. (The additional
‖0 and ‖1 record that the two processes are the left and the right partners in the
communication.)
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There are three di<erent rules, up to symmetries, for every communication between
two processes, say P and Q. We comment on them, and we intuitively relate them
with the three possible situations in which P and Q may be.
Comm InterL 1: P wants to receive from a process located at l, and Q wants to send
to a process located at l′. For the communication to happen the relative addresses of Q
w.r.t. P and of P w.r.t. Q (the path established by the communication) should coincide
with these locations that should be compatible, i.e. l′= l−1, as the side conditions
require. This situation reNects the fact that P and Q “know each other”, possibly
because they have previously established their connection and are session partners.
Note that when l and l′ are )•), we recover the “nonlocated” communication of the
standard -calculus.
Comm InterL;- 1: P wants to receive from a process located at l, while Q is willing
to send a message to any process (it sends on a channel with location variable ′).
The communication is successful only if l coincides with the path established by the
communication, i.e. if l coincides with the relative address of Q w.r.t. P: Q is indeed
the process from which P wants to receive. After the communication, ′ will be suitably
bound to l−1 (the relative address of P w.r.t. Q) within Q, so that now P and Q “know
each other”.
If l is the empty location, then the communication is always successful and ′ will
still be replaced by the relative address of P w.r.t. Q.
Comm Inter- 1: P and Q do not “know each other” and are willing to communicate
with any partner. So, they exchange their relative addresses, as established while de-
ducing the premises. Intuitively, P and Q are performing their initial synchronization.
So their two variables are replaced with the relative address of Q w.r.t. P and vice
versa (l and l′, respectively).
Variables are not located. Consequently, when a located channel cl is communicated,
it becomes a “free” channel: the location l is lost. The index to c becomes )•) if so
it was; otherwise we get c (with  not occurring in the process). Formally, we have
the following.
Denition 5.2. Let F =(y)P be a abstraction and C =(n˜)〈cl〉Q be a concretion. Then,
their interaction is
F@C = (n˜)(P{ct=y}|Q);
where t =
{
)•) if l = )•);
 otherwise (with  not occurring in Q);
Symmetrically for C@F .
Using the above de.nition for communication makes it easier to use a channel in a
multiplexing way. Suppose that a process P is committed to communicate on a channel
cl with a process Q. Also, assume that P sends cl to a third party R, that receives it
as c. The “same” channel c can now be used for further communications between P
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and Q (in this case located at l), as well as for communications between R and some
other process (after  has been suitably instantiated).
In the rules for commitment we use the particular kind of substitution {|l=|}@#,
called selective routed substitution. It uses a particular substitution {|l=|}, called routed,
to be applied only to the sub-process located at #. The routed substitution takes into
account the parallel structure of the process. For that it updates the relative addresses
l while traversing the tree of processes. For instance, to substitute #•#′ for  in P0|P1
requires to substitute ‖i•) ? #•#′ for  in each component Pi.
Denition 5.3. The location routed substitution {|l=|} is de.ned by induction as fol-
lows:
1. m′{|l=|}=
{
m′ ;  = ′;
ml otherwise:
2. (m〈M 〉:P){|l=|}=m{|l=|}〈M{|l=|}〉:P{|l=|}.
3. (m(x):P){|l=|}=m{|l=|}(x):P{|l=|}.
4. (P0|P1){|l=|}=P0{|‖0•? l=|}|P1{|‖1•? l=|}.
5. 0{|l=|}= 0.
6. (P + Q){|l=|}=P{|l=|}+ Q{|l=|}.
7. [M =N ]P{|l=|}= [M{|l=|}=N{|l=|}](P{|l=|}).
There is no case for !P in the above de.nition, i.e. the routed substitution may be
applied only to P, after that !P has been reduced to P | !P. This amounts to saying
that we are also considering processes that inside have routed substitutions not fully
performed. Consequently, the target of the transitions in Table 3 may contain expres-
sions on the form !P{|l=|}. In order not to burden too heavily our notation, we shall
still use P and A for processes, abstractions and concretions with substitutions not yet
performed.
We use the above de.nition to implement a selective substitution that works on the
sub-process of a whole term reachable through #.
Denition 5.4. Let #∈{‖0; ‖1}∗. Then, the selective routed substitution P{|l=|}@# is
de.ned by induction as
• (P0|P1){|l=|}@#=
{
P0{|l=|}@#′ |P1 if #= ‖0#′;
P0|P1{|l=|}@#′ if #= ‖1#′;
• P{|l=|}@ )=P{|l=|}.
The very fact that channels have indexes, which may also be instantiated, guarantees
that two partners can establish a connection that will remain stable along a whole
session. Indeed, let P1 = (Q|R)|P, where Q= c‖0•‖1 (y):Q′ (note that ‖0•‖1 is the address
of R relative to Q). Then, it is immediate verifying that Q accepts inputs on c only
if they come from R; of course this property remains true for all inputs of Q along
c‖0•‖1 . Symmetrically for the process P2 = ( Ic‖0•‖1〈M 〉:Q′|R)|P.
286 C. Bodei et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 271–304
Example 5.5. We now illustrate our partner authentication mechanism, through some
simple examples. First of all, consider a single message exchange between Alice, A
and Bob, B:
A = Ic〈M 〉:A′;
B = c′(x):B′;
P = A|B;
where  and ′ are two location variables. After the message exchange, the semantic
rule Comm Inter- 1 instantiates  and ′ in A′ and B′, respectively, with the address
of A relative to B (i.e., ‖1•‖0) and of B relative to A (i.e., ‖0•‖1), respectively.
Intuitively, the instantiation of a  with an l represents a secure declaration of
the identity of a process through its location l, that cannot be manipulated even by
malicious parties. As we will see later on, located actions also give some security
guarantees on the subsequent message exchanges.
Example (cont’d): Consider now the following protocol (recall that d)•) is simply writ-
ten as d; we shall comment below on the use of channel d, which occurs located in
A′ but not in B′):
A′ = Ic〈MA〉:d(y);
B′ = c′(x): Id〈MB〉;
P′ = A′|B′:
Here, Bob sends a message to Alice after the reception of MA. Note that Alice is
requiring that the second message comes from the same process to which she sent MA.
Since, after the .rst message exchange, the variable  is instantiated to the address of
B′ relative to A′, our semantics guarantees authentication of the second communication
with respect to the (secure) identity declaration of : Alice is assured that the second
message will be sent from the same process that received the .rst one. In order to
illustrate this important point we add another process C′=d〈MC〉+d(x):D which tries
to communicate over channel d. The process P′|C′ has the following steps:
(A′|B′)|C′ →(d‖0•‖1 (y) | Id〈MB〉) | ( Id〈MC〉+ d(x):D):
Since the address of C′ relative to A′ is ‖0‖0•‖1 = ‖0•‖1, then either (the residual
of) A′ receives from and only from (the residual of) B′ or B′ and C′ communicate.
In the .rst case we have
(d‖0•‖1 (y) | Id〈MB〉) | ( Id〈MC〉+ d(x):D) →(0 | 0) | ( Id〈MC〉+ d(x):D):
In the second case we have
(d‖0•‖1 (y) | Id〈MB〉) | ( Id〈MC〉+ d(x):D) →(d‖0•‖1 (y) | 0) |D[MB=x]:
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In the example above, the same channel d is used in two di<erent ways: it is
“located” for Alice and Bob; alternatively, it is “free” for B′ and C′. In Example 5.9,
we shall see that the same channel can be even used in a multiplexing fashion: two
pairs of processes can interleave their communications, still presenting the property of
being engaged with the same process along the entire session.
In the next example we consider the situation where the channel d is located and
used to output a message M . This usage of channels also guarantees a sort of secrecy
of M .
Example 5.6. We have seen in the previous example that message MB was intercepted
by C′, thus violating its secrecy. Consider now the following protocol:
A′′ = Ic〈MA〉:d(y);
B′′ = c′(x): Id′〈MB〉;
P′′ = A′′|B′′:
Here, Bob is requiring that the message MB is received by the same user that sent the
.rst message. In this case Bob obtains a form of secrecy: he is assured that MB will
be read by the process identi.ed by ′, i.e., the process that sent message MA. Indeed,
any new process C′′=d(w) fails to read MB. We have that
(A′′|B′′)|C′′ →(d(y) | Id‖1•‖0〈MB〉) |d(w)
but the address of C′′ relative to B′′ is ‖0‖1•‖1 = ‖1•‖0.
We have seen that locating inputs and outputs corresponds to guaranteeing authen-
tication and secrecy of the communication, respectively. We can summarize these two
concepts as follows. In a message exchange and with respect to an address l, a process
obtains
Partner authentication: Whenever it receives the message from the process reachable
at l, only.
Secrecy: Whenever only the process reachable at l will receive the message.
We now state the above more precisely, exploiting De.nition 4.1. We need the
notion of context with two holes, written C[−;−].
Theorem 5.7 (Authentication). Let Qˆ=C[R; S]; R= cl(x):P0 and S = Ict〈M 〉:P1.
Then; Qˆ¿Q →C′[P0{M=x}; P1]; with Q@##0 =R and Q@##1 = S; if and only if
l=#0•#1.
Proof. By inspection on the rules used to deduce the transition; in particular consider
the side conditions of rules Comm InterL 1 (where t= l−1) and Comm InterL;- 1
(where t= ).
Theorem 5.8 (Secrecy). Let Qˆ=C[R; S]; R= cl〈M 〉:P0 and S = ct(x):P1.
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Then; Qˆ¿Q →C′[P0; P1{M=x}]; with Q@##0 =R and Q@##1 = S; if and only if
l=#0•#1.
Proof. Analogous to the previous proof.
The next example illustrates how locating both inputs and outputs guarantees a per-
manent hooking between two parties and allows to model multiple sessions quite easily.
Example 5.9. Consider the following processes:
A˜= Ic〈MA〉:d(y);
B˜= c′(x): Id′〈MB〉;
P˜ = A˜|B˜:
Indeed both Alice and Bob are assured that the second message (and also all the subse-
quent messages sent and received on located channels) will be sent=received by the user
that interacted in the .rst message exchange. Hence, the two users, after the .rst com-
munication are permanently hooked together. This time a third user C˜ = c′(x): Id′〈MC〉,
is indeed able to take the place of B˜ in the communication but only if it starts the ses-
sion with A˜. Instead, it can never communicate with A˜ after the .rst message exchange
between A˜ and B˜ occurred.
We now model multiple sessions. Consider P˜multi = !(MA)A˜|!(MB)B˜, where an un-
bounded number of instances of Alice and Bob are present, each with a di<erent fresh
message. Consider now two instances of A˜ sending their .rst messages to two instances
of B˜, i.e, two parallel sessions:
P˜multi
→ (d‖0‖0•‖1‖0 (y) | !(MA)A˜) | ( Id‖1‖0•‖0‖0〈M 1B〉|!(MB)B˜ )
→ (d‖0‖0•‖1‖0 (y) | (d‖0‖1‖0•‖1‖1‖0 (y)|!(MA)A˜)) |
( Id‖1‖0•‖0‖0 〈M 1B〉 | ( Id‖1‖1‖0•‖0‖1‖0〈M 2B〉 | !(MB)B˜))
Note that after the .rst message exchange the partners in each session are permanently
hooked: the second message is always sent to the correct party, the one who initiated
the session. As a consequence, no replay of messages is possible among di<erent
sessions, also in the presence of a malicious party.
6. The spi-calculus
Syntax: In this section we brieNy recall, often also literally, the spi-calculus [3], in
its monadic version from [1]. This calculus is an extension of the -calculus, introduced
for the description and the analysis of cryptographic protocols. A .rst di<erence with
the -calculus is that the spi-calculus has no summation operator +. Also, terms can be
structured as pairs (M;N ), successors of terms suc(M) and encryptions {M1; : : : ; Mk}N .
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The last term above represents the ciphertext obtained by encrypting M1; : : : ; Mk under
the key N , using a shared-key cryptosystem such as DES [26].
Denition 6.1. Terms and processes are de.ned according to the following BNF-like
grammars:
L;M; N ::= terms
n names
x variables
(M;N ) pair
0 zero
suc(M) successor
{M1; : : : ; Mk}N shared-key encryption
P;Q; R ::= processes
0 nil
:P pre.x
P|P parallel composition
(m)P restriction
[M =N ]P matching
!P replication
let (x; y)=M in P pair splitting
case M of 0 : P suc(x) : Q integer case
case L of {x1; : : : ; xk}N in P shared-key decryption
where  may either be M (x) or M 〈N 〉. 3
Most of the process constructs are the same of -calculus. The new ones decompose
terms:
• The process let (x; y)=M in P behaves as P[M0=x;M1=y] if M =(M0; M1) and it is
stuck if M is not a pair.
• The process case M of 0 :P suc(x) :Q behaves as P if M is 0, as Q[N=x] if
M = suc(N ) and it is stuck otherwise.
• The process case L of {x1; : : : ; xk}N in P attempts to decrypt L with the key N ; if
L has the form {M1; : : : ; Mk}N , then the process behaves as P[M1=x1; : : : ; Mk=xk ], and
otherwise is stuck.
The structural congruence and the operational semantics for commitment are exactly
the same of the -calculus given in Table 1. Some new reductions rules are instead
needed.
Red split: Let (x; y)= (M;N ) in P¿P[M=x; N=y].
Red zero: Case 0 of 0 : P suc(x) : Q¿P.
Red suc: Case suc(M) of 0 : P suc(x) : Q¿Q[M=x].
Red decrypt: Case {M1; : : : ; Mk}N of {x1; : : : ; xk}N in P¿P[M1=x1; : : : ; Mk=xk ].
3 Although M is an arbitrary term, we only consider it to be a name or a variable (to be instantiated to
a name), because these are the only useful cases (see [3]).
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7. Names of the spi-calculus handled locally
To introduce our second authentication mechanism, we need to further exploit the
ideas contained in [7], where the relative addresses, introduced in Section 3, are used
to handle names locally to sequential processes in an operational manner. The space of
names of a whole process is then partitioned into local environments associated each
with its sequential sub-processes.
To avoid global management of names, we have to solve two problems. Names have
to be declared locally and to be brand-new in that local environment. Furthermore, when
a name is exported to other local environments via communications or by applying a
reduction rule, we must guarantee that there are no clashes involving the other names
around. A purely mechanical way of doing that is in [7].
For the sake of simplicity, instead of recalling also the mechanism for generating
fresh names, here we assume that a name is fresh, whenever needed, and we shall
recall that by a side condition.
As for keeping names distinct, consider two di<erent sequential processes, say G
and R, that have two syntactically equal names, say n. Suppose now that G sends n to
R. To distinguish between the two di<erent instances of n in the local environment of
R, the name generated by G will be received enriched with the address of G relative
to R, which points back from R to the local environment of G.
A slightly more complex situation arises when a process receives a name and sends
it to another process. The name must arrive at the new receiver with the address of the
generator (not of the sender) relative to the new receiver. Consider again Fig. 1, where
P1 sends to P2 a name generated by P3. The rules (in Table 4) for communication use
address composition to determine the address of P3 relative to P2, by composing the
address of the message (recording the address of P3 w.r.t. P1) with the relative address
of P1 w.r.t. P2.
We carry the localized semantics of the -calculus of [7] on the monadic spi-calculus.
First of all, we introduce the new set of localized names, that are names pre.xed with
relative addresses.
Denition 7.1. Let N′=(A ·N) be the set of localized names, where N is the set
of standard names and “·” is the operator of language concatenation.
For simplicity, we assume r; s; u; : : : ; possibly indexed, to range over bothN′ andN
and, unless necessary, we do not syntactically distinguish localized terms from terms,
i.e. terms pre.xed with relative addresses like #•#′M , from those not pre.xed.
As we said above, we do not recall how the mechanism of [7] generates fresh
names whenever needed: here we simply assume them fresh. However, we require
that restricted names are always localized, i.e. they occur in a declaration as (•n).
Technically, this is achieved by transforming a process P with (n) into a new process,
obtained by replacing each sub-process of P on the form (n)Q with the process
(•n)Q{|•n=n|}s (the substitution {|=|}s is in De.nition 7.3).
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When a term M is exported from a process, say P, to another, say Q, it is necessary
to compose the relative address pre.xing M with the relative address of P w.r.t. Q.
This composition is performed by the term address composition, that extends address
composition in De.nition 3.2. Applied to a relative address and to a localized term, it
returns an updated localized term.
Denition 7.2. Term address composition ?T is de.ned as
#•#′?T#0•#1M = (#•#′?#0•#1)M:
We say that #•#′ ?T #0•#1M , is the term #0•#1M exported to the relative address #•#′.
Names in N, variables and natural numbers are not pre.xed with relative addresses
and are insensitive to address composition:
∀z ∈N ∪ Nat ∪V: #•#′?z ≡ z:
We now explain how our semantics deals with terms. First, note that the operator
?T considers the compound term M as a whole, as it does not distribute address
composition over the sub-terms of M . Now, consider the encryption term {M}K . It
is an atomic entity, and so it is handled as it were a new name, local to the process
that encrypts M , say P. The two localized terms M and K are frozen just like they
were at encryption time, and their own relative addresses are not changed when the
encrypted message is sent through the net; again, these relative addresses cannot be
updated. Since {M}K is atomic, its relative address, say #0•#1, will always point to the
process P that made the encryption. (Technically, M and K are frozen like they were
in the process S containing all the restrictions on the names used in the encryption.) In
this way, when decrypting {M}K the semantic rules recover the correct addresses for
M and K by simply composing the actual address of {M}K , #0•#1, with the (frozen)
relative addresses of M and K , respectively. The same management described above is
used for successor and pairs. In the .rst case, the term M is frozen in suc(M), while
the terms M and N are frozen in (M;N ).
Also the routed substitution of De.nition 5:3 is extended to deal both with terms
and with processes in the spi-calculus; it distributes to each sub-term or sub-process
(note that below the term N cannot be a variable).
Denition 7.3. The spi routed substitution {|N=x|}s is de.ned by induction as follows
on
terms:
1. r{|N=x|}s= r, with r ∈N ∪N′;
2: z{|N=x|}s =
{
z; x = z;
N otherwise;
3. 0{|N=x|}s=0;
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4. suc(M){|N=x|}s= suc(M{|N=x|}s);
5. (M1; M2){|N=x|}s=(M1{|N=x|}s; M2{|N=x|}s);
6. {M1; : : : ; Mk}M0{|N=x|}s= {M1{|N=x|}s; : : : ; Mk{|N=x|}s}M0{|N=x|}s .
processes:
1. 0{|N=x|}s= 0;
2. (r〈M 〉:P){|N=x|}s= Ir{|N=x|}s〈M{|N=x|}s〉:P{|N=x|}s;
3.
(r(y):P){|N=x|}s =
{
r{|N=x|}s(y):P; x = y
r{|N=x|}s(y):P{|N=x|}s otherwise;
4. (P |Q){|N=x|}s=P{|‖0•?TN=x|}s |Q{|‖1•?TN=x|}s;
5.
((#•#′n)P){|N=x|}s
=

(#•#′m)(P{|#•#′m=#•#′n|}s){|N=x|}s; #•#′n = N and
#•#′m fresh in P;
(#•#′n)P{|N=x|}s otherwise;
6. ([M1 =M2]P){|N=x|}s= [M1{|N=x|}s=M2{|N=x|}]P{|N=x|}s;
7.
(let (y1; y2) = M in P){|N=x|}s
=
{
let (y1; y2) = M{|N=x|}s in P; x = yi for some i;
let (y1; y2) = M{|N=x|}s in P{|N=x|}s otherwise;
8.
(case M of 0 : P suc(y) : Q){|N=x|}s
=
{
case M{|N=x|}s of 0 : P{|N=x|}s suc(y) : Q; x = y;
case M{|N=x|}s of 0 : P{|N=x|}s suc(y) : Q{|N=x|}s otherwise;
9.
(case L of {y1; : : : ; yk}M in P){|N=x|}s
=
{
case L{|N=x|}s of {x1; : : : ; xk}M{|N=x|}s in P; x = yi for some i;
case L{|N=x|}s of {x1; : : : ; xk}M{|N=x|}s in P{|N=x|}s otherwise:
Now, the selective routed substitution for the spi-calculus is exactly as in
De.nition 5.4.
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7.1. Localized congruence
The rules for the structural congruence require some changes to accommodate local-
ized names:
1. (r)P1|P2≡ (•‖0 ? r)(P1|P2);
2. P1|(r)P2≡ (•‖1 ? r)(P1|P2);
3. (r)〈M 〉P1 |P2≡ (•‖0 ? r)〈•‖0 ?T M 〉(P1 |P2);
4. P1 | (r)〈M 〉P2≡ (•‖1 ? r)〈•‖1 ?T M 〉(P1 |P2):
Note that no -conversion is needed: each binding occurrence of the name r in P1 (P2,
resp.) is replaced by ‖0 ? r (‖1 ? r, resp.) which is di<erent from any name s in P1 (P2,
resp.), because of the properties of address composition ?.
7.2. Localized reduction relation
We add the following reduction rules to those for matching and replication:
Red split: Let (x; y)=#0•#1(M;N ) in P¿P{|#0•#1?TM=x|}s{|#0•#1?TN=y|}s.
Red suc: Case #0•#1suc(M) of 0 : P suc(x) : Q¿Q{|#0•#1?TM=x|}s.
Red decrypt: Case #0•#1{M1; : : : ; Mk}N of {y1; : : : ; yk}#0•#1?TN in
P¿P{|#0•#1?TM1=y1|}s : : : {|#0•#1?TMk=yk |}s.
When a process decomposes a term, the involved sub-terms are updated. The intuition
for the decryption rule is that we can decrypt a message {M}N only if we use the key
K =#0•#1?TN which is exactly how the frozen key N should appear to the receiver of
the encrypted message. When K and N , although starting from di<erent sites, do refer
to the same key, the semantic rules decrypt the message and update its relative address
by composing #0•#1 and M . The process P then behaves as P{|#0•#1?TM=y|}s.
7.3. Localized commitment relation
Eventually, we present in Table 4 the extended commitments rules. The localized
commitment relation is written P @#−→A, where P is a process,  is the action, per-
formed by the sub-process at #, and A is an agent.
The component # of labels is needed for checking some side conditions of a few
rules. Communication rules are successful only if the complementary actions refer to
the same name; while for the restriction rule it is necessary to check that there are
no clashes between the action and the restricted name. The semantic rules update the
messages with the relative addresses of the sender with respect to the receiver. Indeed,
the congruence rules lift relative addresses and restrictions as much as needed. For
instance, by applying (r)P1|P2≡(•‖0 ? r)(P1|P2), we have that the restricted name r
in P1 appears as •‖0 ? r in the process (P1|P2); similarly, by applying the congruence
rule P | (r)〈M 〉P′≡(•‖1r)〈•‖1?TM 〉(P |P′); the term M in P′ appears as •‖1?TM in
(P |P′). Finally, also interactions have to update relative addresses.
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Table 4
The localized commitment relation
Comm Out
r〈M〉:P Ir→ ()〈M〉P
Comm In
r(x):P r→ (x)P
Comm Par 1
P0
@#−→A0
P0|P1 @‖0#−→ A0|P1
Comm Par 2
P1
@#−→A1
P0|P1 @‖1#−→ P0|A1
Comm Inter 1
P0
r′@#−→F0 P1 Ir@#
′
→ C1
P0|P1 →F0@ˆC1
if r′ = ‖0#•‖1#′ ? r
Comm Inter 2
P0
Ir@#−→C0 P1 r
′@#′−→ F1
P0|P1 →C0@ˆF1
if r′ = ‖1#′•‖0#? r
Comm Res
P
@#−→A
(u)P
@#−→ (u)A
if )•#?  =∈ {u; Iu}
Comm Red
P¿P′ P′ @#−→A′
P
@#−→A′
Comm Struct
P≡Q Q @#−→A A≡A′
P
@#−→A′
Denition 7.4. Let F =(x)P0 be an abstraction and C =(r˜)〈M 〉P1 be a concretion.
Then, their localized interactions are
F@ˆC = (•‖1?r˜)(P0{| ‖0•‖1?TM=x|}s |P1);
C@ˆF = (•‖0?r˜)(P1 |P0{ | ‖1•‖0?TM=x|}s):
To see how the localized interactions work, consider F@ˆC. The restricted names,
known as r˜ in P1, are duly updated to •‖0 ? r˜ in the parallel composition of P′0 (i.e. P0
after the substitution) and P1. As for the message, it appears as M in P1 and has to
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be exported at P0: the term address composition ?T is therefore applied to the relative
address ‖1•‖0 and to M . As an example, consider again the processes in Fig. 1 and
suppose that P0 is willing to send •N to the process P3. Then, the message will appear
as •‖0‖0N in (P0|P1). It will replace, through the routed substitution, the variable x in
(P2|(P3|P4) as ‖1•‖0‖0N . Note that it will arrive to P3 as ‖1‖1‖0•‖0‖0N , i.e. enriched
with the relative address of P0 w.r.t. P3.
8. Message authentication
We can now intuitively present our authentication primitive [M
@
=N ], akin to the
matching operator. This “address matching” is passed only if the relative addresses of
the two localized terms M and N coincide. The intuition is that if we know which
process packed N , say P, we can also say that M comes indeed from P, thus authen-
ticating it. More formally, the extensions due to the new primitive consist in a new
case for processes and a new reduction rule.
Denition 8.1. Let M;N be two terms as in De.nition 6.1, and l; l′ ∈Loc be two
relative addresses. Then
[lM
@
= l′N ]P
is a process, on which we de.ne the following reduction rule:
Red Address Match. [lM
@
= lN ]P¿P.
Note that free names are pre.xed with the empty relative address.
Hereafter, we assume an initial start-up phase, in which processes exchange a mes-
sage and .x their relative addresses. This can be obtained, e.g., through a preliminary
communication between the partners, from A to B on a restricted shared channel. This
start-up phase is indeed an abstraction of the preliminary secure exchange of secret
information (e.g., long term keys) which is necessary in every cryptographic proto-
col. We will see an example of this in the next session. This initialization step can
be avoided by using our partner authentication primitive; however, for the sake of
presentation, we do not combine here the two primitives.
Consider the following simple example, where the process B wants to authenticate
a message from A even in the presence of an intruder E. The protocol P is
P = A | (B |E);
A = (•M) Ic〈•M 〉:A′;
B = c(x):[x
@
= ‖1‖0•‖00]B′:
(Recall that M is a name that appears as •M in A, by assumption; analogously for
N in E, below.) Now we show the role that localized names play, and how they
guarantee by construction that B′ is executed only if the message bound to x has been
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Fig. 3. The process B detects that the message ‖1‖0•‖0M is authentic while the message ‖0•‖1N comes
from the intruder E.
originated by A, i.e., if the message received on channel c is indeed M . As said above,
the relative address ‖1‖0•‖0 pointing from B to A, encodes the “site” hosting A, thus
it gives the identity of the process from which B is expecting to receive a message on
channel c. In order to analyse the behaviour of the protocol in a hostile environment,
we consider a generic intruder E, as powerful as possible.
We now examine the following two possible message exchanges:
Message 1: A→ B : M;
Message 2: E → B : N:
The .rst message represents the correct exchange of message M from A to B. The
second one is an attempt of E to send a di<erent message N to B. The intruder E
could actually be of the following form:
E = (•N ) Ic〈•N 〉:E′ + 〈other bad actions〉:
The names M and N are received by B pre.xed by the relative address corresponding
to the respective originators.
Fig. 3 shows the two message exchanges. In particular, we see that M is received
by B as ‖1‖0•‖0M while N becomes ‖0•‖1N . It is now immediate to see that only in
the .rst case B will evolve to B{|M=x|}s, while in the latter it will stop. This is so
because only ‖1‖0•‖0M matches with the address of A. Every attempt of the intruder
of introducing new messages on c is .ltered out by the authentication primitive.
A further interesting case arises when the intruder intercepts M and forwards it to
B. We will show that our mechanism accepts the message as authentic. In particular,
we reconsider the previous protocol and we analyse the case of a di<erent intruder
that, masquerading as B (written E(B)), intercepts M and forwards it to B:
Message 3: A→ E(B) : M;
Message 4: E → B : M:
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Since E does not, actually cannot modify M we would like to accept the message
in B even if it has been forwarded by E. No matter how many times a message is
forwarded, address composition maintains its integrity and the identity of its generator.
In detail, E(B) receives M as ‖1‖1•‖0M . When E forwards it to B, the message is
composed with the address of E relative to B, ‖0•‖1, yielding (‖0•‖1 ? ‖1‖1•‖0)M .
By applying rule (1) of De.nition 3.2 we see that the message is received by B as
‖1‖0•‖0M , and therefore it is accepted as authentic. Note also that B can use ‖1‖1•‖0M
as a component of a new message M ′. The receiver R of M ′ will get M pre.xed by
the relative address of A, say #. So R can check that M ′ has been packed by B′, hence
the authenticity of M ′, and even of its components. Indeed the composition of # and
‖1‖1•‖0, via ?, gives the address of the originator of M (i.e. A), relative to R.
We end this section with the following property, in which C[−] and C[−;−] are
contexts with one and two holes, respectively, and P{|M˜i=x˜i|} stands for P{|M˜1=x˜1|} : : :
{|M˜n=x˜n|}.
Theorem 8.2 (Address matching). Let Qˆ = C[R; S]; R = c(x):C0[[x
@
= lN ]P0] and
S = Ic〈M 〉:P1; where the input on c binds the variable x in the matching. Suppose that
Qˆ ¿ Q →Q′=C′[(C0[[x @= lN ]P0]){|l′M=x|}; P1]→∗Q′′ = C′′[(C′′0 [[x
@
= lN ]P0]){|l′M=x|}
{|M˜i=x˜i|}; P′1 ]; where Q@##0 =R; Q@##1 = S and C0[[x
@
= lN ]P0]@#2 = [x
@
= lN ]P0; for
some C′; C′′0 ; M˜i; x˜i and P
′
1 ; such that Q
′@##0=(C0[[x
@
= lN ]P0]){|l′M=x|}; Q′@##1=
P1; Q′′@##1 =P′1 and Q
′′@##0 = (C′′0 [[x
@
= lN ]P0]){|l′M=x|}{|M˜i=x˜i|}.
Then Q′′¿C′′[(C′′0 [P0]{|l′M=x|}){|M˜i=x˜i|}; P′1 ] if and only if l′=#0 •#1 and l=l′ ?#2 • ).
Proof. In the .rst communication the variable x occurring in the matching is instan-
tiated to l′′= l′ ? #2•), because the input binds x (recall that, in De.nition 7.3, the
substituting term is enriched while going down in the tree of sequential processes).
The sequence of steps leading to Q′′ only change the contexts C′; C0 and the process
P1, and it possibly binds some variables x˜i in P0{|l′M=x|}. Now the reduction on match-
ing can be performed if and only if [l′′M
@
= lN ] is at top-level in C′′, and l′′= l′ ?#2•)
is equal to l.
9. Implementing authentication
In this section we show that our notion of message authentication based on locations
helps in studying and analysing cryptographic protocols. The main idea is to observe
if a speci.c authentication protocol is indeed a good “implementation” of our authenti-
cation primitive, i.e., if the cryptographic protocol is as strong in detecting names with
an “incorrect” relative address as our authentication primitive is.
Recall that in the spi-calculus a compound term, such as an encryption M , is con-
sidered localized, i.e. its relative address, say #0•#1, will always point to the process
P that made the encryption. In this way, when decrypting {M}K the semantic rules
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Fig. 4. A correct execution of the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol.
recover the correct addresses for M and K by simply composing the actual address of
{M}K , #0•#0, with the (frozen) relative addresses of M and K , respectively.
We now show an example of a correct run of the Wide Mouthed Frog key exchange
protocol. Consider its simpli.ed version analysed in [3]. The two processes A and B
share keys KAS and KBS with a trusted server S. In order to establish a secure channel
with B, A sends a fresh key KAB encrypted with KAS to the server S. Then, the server
decrypts the key and forwards it to B, this time encrypted with KBS . Now B has the
key KAB and A can send a message M encrypted with KAB to B. The protocol should
guarantee that when B receives M , such a message has been indeed originated by A.
The protocol is composed of the following three messages:
Message 1 A→ S : {KAB}KAS ;
Message 2 S → B : {KAB}KBS ;
Message 3 A→ B : {M}KAB :
Its speci.cation in our calculus with localized names (having mechanically replaced
restricted names with their localized counterparts) is
P = (•KAS) (•KBS) ((A|B) | S);
A= (•KAB) (•M)(cAS〈{•KAB}‖0‖•KAS 〉:cAB〈{•M}•KAB〉);
S = cAS(x):case x of {y}‖1•KAS in cBS〈{y}‖1•KBS 〉;
B= cBS(x):case x of {y}‖0‖1•KBS in
cAB(z):case z of {r}y in Bˆ:
Not surprisingly, the speci.cation is in the style of [3], except for localized restricted
names. Fig. 4 shows how the localized names are handled in a correct execution of the
protocol P. Note that KAS and KBS assume a di<erent relative address in the di<erent
processes.
After the reception of message 2, B decrypts the received message
‖0‖1•‖1{‖1•‖0‖0KAB}‖1•KBS :
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This means computing
case ‖0‖1•‖1{‖1•‖0‖0KAB}‖1•KBS of {y}‖0‖1•KBS in cAB(z):
case z of {r}y in Bˆ:
The reduction rule Decrypt applies because ‖0‖1•KBS = ‖0‖1•‖1 ?T ‖1•KBS . The vari-
able y is then set to (‖0‖1•‖1 ? ‖1•‖0‖0)KAB; that results in ‖1•‖0KAB, by rule (3)
of De.nition 3.2. This is indeed the correct reference to the key KAB generated by A
and installed in its local environment. In the last message B receives ‖1•‖0{•M}•KAB , and
succeeds in decrypting it with ‖1•‖0KAB, obtaining ‖1•‖0M . The addresses of M and
of A relative to B are equal, so M is indeed authentic. This characterizes a “correct”
execution.
It is well known that an attack can take place over two sessions of the protocol above.
Basically, it occurs when the intruder replays some messages of the .rst session in the
second one. We follow below the formalization of [3], where this attack is analysed.
Note that in the single session illustrated above no problem arises instead, even if an
intruder intercepts the message sent by A, then forwarded to B. Indeed the message
received is the right one, as we have just seen above, as no one can alter neither the
relative addresses, nor the encrypted message {M}KAB .
Now, we show that the attack above is immediately detected by an observer that
can compare localized names, e.g. by using our authentication primitive [M
@
=N ]. For
the sake of readability, we call A′ and B′ the two instances of A and B in the second
session where A′ is trying to send the message M ′ to B′ using the session key K ′AB:
Message 1 A→ S: {KAB}KAS ;
Message 2 S → B: {KAB}KBS
〈E eavesdrops Message 2〉
Message 3 A→ B: {M}KAB
〈E eavesdrops Message 3〉
Message 1′ A′ → S: {K ′AB}KAS ;
Message 2′ E(S)→ B′: {KAB}KBS ;
Message 3′ E(A)′ → B′: {M}KAB :
The intruder eavesdrops the .rst session and then replays messages 2 and 3 in the
second session (messages 2′ and 3′). The result is that B′ receives a copy of M
instead of one of M ′.
In order to model two parallel session of the protocol, we consider the following
speci.cation:
P′ = (•KAS)(•KBS)(((A |A) | (B |B)) | S) |E;
where the addresses of localized names •KAS and •KBS are suitably updated in the
processes A, B and S. Note that A generates both M and KAB as fresh names. So each
A of A |A originates two di<erent messages, say M and M ′, and two di<erent keys,
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Fig. 5. An attack on the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol; where ‖ki stands for a sequence of k tags ‖i , and
where K̂AS = ‖30•KAS , K̂BS = ‖1•KBS and K̂ ′AS = ‖20‖1•KAS .
say KAB and K ′AB. We also modify S so that it can serve more sessions (for the sake
of simplicity we de.ne a server which is just able to handle two sequential sessions):
S = cAS(x):case x of {y}‖1•KAS in cBS〈{y}‖1•KBS 〉:
cAS(z):case z of {w}‖1•KAS in cBS〈{w}‖1•KBS 〉
and we specify the intruder as
E = cBS(x):cAB(y):cBS〈x〉:cAB〈y〉;
where the names cAB, cAS and cBS are free, and thus known to all the processes of P′
(unlike •KAS and •KBS that are bound).
Now we can observe the attack sequence in Fig. 5. In particular, when the process
B′ decrypts message ‖1‖1•‖0‖0{•M}•KAB , it obtains ‖1‖1•‖0‖0M which is a message
originated from A and not from A′, as it should be. Indeed, the address of A′ relative
to B′ is ‖1‖1•‖0‖1, and the attack is detected.
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We now want to show how the protocol can be done secure by construction through
our authentication primitive. The idea is that the last message should be accepted only
if it has been originated by the correct initiator. In order to do this we need at least
a message from the initiator whose address can be compared with the last message of
the protocol. The trick is to add a startup message that securely hooks one initiator
with one responder, by sending a fresh message on a restricted channel. The resulting
speci.cation follows (the modi.cations are in bold font and the restricted names are
not localized, for the sake of readability):
P′′ = (KAS)(KBS)((startup)((A′′|A′′) | (B′′|B′′)) | S) |E;
A′′ = (KAB)(M)(MA)(startup〈MA〉:cAS〈{KAB}KAS 〉:cAB〈{M}KAB〉);
S = cAS(x):case x of {y}KAS in cBS〈{y}KBS 〉:
cAS(z):case z of {w}KAS in cBS〈{w}KBS 〉;
B′′ = startup(ma):cBS(x):case x of {y}KBS in
cAB(z):case z of {r}y in [r @=ma]Bˆ:
In P′′ the two B′′ processes receive by the two A′′ two di<erent startup messages, with
two di<erent addresses. It is thus no longer possible for the intruder to carry out a
replay attack. In fact, the cheated B′′ will be able to stop before delivering the message
to Bˆ. By comparing the traces of this protocol correct “by construction” with the traces
of the previous one it is easy to see that they are not equivalent. A potential attack is
thus detected.
10. Conclusions and future work
We de.ned two primitives that guarantee partner and message authentication over
public channels, based on the same semantic feature derived from the proved transition
systems [10]. Partner authentication is based on a semantics of the -calculus where
names of channels are indexed with the expected relative addresses of the communicat-
ing parties. In particular, any time two processes try to communicate over a common
channel, their relative addresses are checked against the index of the channel used.
The communication is enabled only if the check is passed, i.e. if the relative addresses
are compatible with the indexes. Moreover, the very same channel can be used in a
multiplexing fashion: two processes, say P and Q, can go on exchanging messages on
channel c, interleaving their activity with that of another pair of processes, say R and
S, using c as well. It will never be the case that a message for P is read by R or
comes from S, unless this is indeed the intended behaviour of both P and R or both
P and S.
Message authentication is based on a semantics of the spi-calculus where each mes-
sage M is localized, via a relative address l, to the process P that packed
M . The authentication primitive compares the relative address l with the address l′
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of a process Q, relative to the receiver of M . The check succeeds and authenti-
cates the message M only if l= l′, expressing that it was indeed the process Q that
packed M .
Our two primitives are in a sense orthogonal, as they operate on independent features
of the calculi considered. Of course, one may combine them, e.g. by carrying on the
spi-calculus the notion of located channel introduced for the -calculus. Both notions
of authentication can then be guaranteed “by construction”.
Note that our partner authentication primitive does not transform a public channel
into a private one. Indeed, partner authentication clearly separates the concepts of
authentication and secrecy. More importantly, once two processes communicating on
public channels are hooked it is impossible for a third process to interfere in the
communication.
Our notion of message authentication does not need private channels, as well. A mes-
sage M may be considered authentic even if it has been intercepted or eavesdropped,
i.e., our mechanism does not guarantee the secrecy of M , but only that M has been
generated or packed by the claimed entity. Thus, our primitive corresponds neither to a
private channel in the basic -calculus, nor to a cryptographic one in the spi-calculus:
both appear to be too strong to message authentication alone, as they guarantee also
secrecy.
The idea of exploiting locations for the analysis of authentication comes from [14],
where however entities are bound to physical addresses of the net. An approach related
is the Abadi et al. [2], in which principals have explicit, .xed names (see also the
Join-calculus [18] and SEAL [33]). Here we relaxed the rigidity of a .xed mapping of
sites, by introducing a sort of “identi.ers of sites” represented by relative addresses.
As a matter of fact, the actual placement of a process on a site can be recovered
by composing our localized names (akin to the environment function of sequential
languages) with allocation tables (similar to a store). Actually, [14] models a wider
notion of authentication, that we plan to investigate next.
As discussed in the paper, our primitive may not be implementable directly. Indeed,
one should have a low-level, highly reliable mechanism to manage localized names,
which is unrealistic in many cases, but possible, for instance, in LAN or virtual private
networks. A further step could be encrypting relative addresses within the header of
messages, in the style of IPsec [31]. Nevertheless, our proposal can help reasoning on
authentication and security from an abstract point of view. This is indeed the main aim
of our approach and we are presently developing some ideas that we brieNy describe
in the following.
First, it could be possible to verify the correctness of a cryptographic protocol by
showing that its messages implement partner authentication when needed. As an exam-
ple, a typical challenge-response technique requires to send a nonce (random challenge)
and to expect it back, encrypted with a secret shared key. Challenge-response can be
proved to implement our located input actions, under some suitable conditions. The
proofs that implementations satisfy speci.cations are often hard, just because private
channels are used to model authenticated channels. Indeed, private channels often seem
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too far from cryptographic implementations. So our proposal can help, as we need no
private channels.
Moreover, we could verify if a cryptography-based protocol ensures message authen-
tication, by checking a version of it containing also the primitive [M
@
=N ]: the original
formulation and ours should exhibit the same behaviour. This check of speci.cations
against implementations, is much in the style of the congruence-based techniques typ-
ical of process calculi (see, e.g., [3]).
Finally, we feel con.dent that our proposal scales up, because some languages for
concurrent and reactive systems, like Facile [32], PICT [28], CML [27], Esterel [4]
are built on top of a core process calculus like the one we use here; also, they have
an operational semantics that can easily be turned into a proved one, as the successful
cases of Facile [11] and Esterel [23] show. Of course, a great deal of work is still
necessary to make our proposal applicable in real cases.
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